Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France, regarded as one of the foundation texts of conservative political thought, was published on November 1, 1790. Burke’s argument contained not only a rebuttal of revolutionary principles, which he found hopelessly idealized and impractical, but a prophecy that the ensuing destabilization and violence would open the door to a charismatic military opportunist, someone “who understands the art of conciliating the soldiery, and who possesses the true spirit of command”:
Armies will obey him on his personal account. There is no other way of securing military obedience in this state of things. But the moment in which that event shall happen, the person who really commands the army is your master; the master (that is little) of your king, the master of your Assembly, the master of your whole republic.
As Jesse Norman says in Edmund Burke: The First Conservative, Burke’s words offered “a frighteningly exact description of the emergence of Napoleon Bonaparte.” Almost nine years to the day after Burke published his Reflections, Napoleon staged the coup which allowed him to master not only the French republic but, over the next fifteen years, most of Europe. Unsurprisingly, after the Allies finally reined in the Little Emperor, they lost no time in implementing policies and national boundaries that ushered in a new “Conservative Order,” one that favored the old ruling dynasties.
The unofficial birthday of that new Conservative Order is November 1, 1814, when over 200 states and princely houses, representing Europe’s finest royalty and brightest diplomats, gathered for the Congress of Vienna. As described in David King’s Vienna, 1814: How the Conquerors of Napoleon Made Love, War and Peace, the eight-month discussion of how to rebuild Europe was also the party of the century:
Reasoned opinion predicted that all negotiations would be wrapped up in three or four weeks. Even the most seasoned diplomats expected no more than six. But the delegates, thrilled by the prospects of a lasting peace, indulged in unrestrained celebrations. The Vienna peace conference soon degenerated into a glittering vanity fair: masked balls, medieval-style jousts, and grand formal banquets — a “sparkling chaos” that would light up the banks of the Danube.
Europe’s most recent political makeover took effect on November 1, 1993, when the twelve-nation European Union — twenty-eight nations now, though soon to be twenty-seven — was established. Also born from the chaos of war, the EU seemed like a good idea to many countries reeling from WWII, as reflected in this 1946 speech in Zurich by, ironically, Winston Churchill:
We British have our Commonwealth of Nations . . . why should there not be a European group which could give a sense of enlarged patriotism and common citizenship to the distracted peoples of this turbulent and mighty continent? And why should it not take its rightful place with other great groupings and help shape the onward destinies of men? . . . Therefore I say to you: let Europe arise!
Churchill’s comments give title to the prizewinning Turbulent and Mighty Continent, in which the eminent British sociologist Anthony Giddens offers a balanced critique of the EU’s problems and suggests how Churchill’s vision might still be achieved. In Out of Ashes: A New History of Europe in the Twentieth Century, the German-American historian Konrad H. Jarausch also supports a reformed and reinvigorated EU, because “the European Alternative” may be the best one available — even for America:
No doubt the continent is confronting serious problems of aging, immigration, fiscal control, institutional structure, and global competitiveness — but they are ultimately solvable. Instead of being an imperfect clone of American modernity, Europe has different ideas about the role of religion, gun control, capital punishment, welfare support, public transportation, and international organization, just to mention a few. To many liberal Americans, these European solutions are more appealing than Tea Party prescriptions of military strength, unilateral intervention, unrestrained speculation, and social conservatism.
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Sig Nordal 